JOHN STEELE
20 Mars 2016 à 17:12

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JOHN STEELE
20 Mars 2016 à 17:07

Cher Amis: Ci-joint un article par moi-meme ecrit pour le hebdomadaire ouvrier le Militant sur la lutte de Tom Harding et Richard Labrie les deaux Métallos blamés pour le désastre a Lac0Méganic. Je pense que vos lecteurs trouveront l'article utile et je suggère que vous publiez l'article qui a été traduit de l'anglais. ______________________ THE MILITANT Année 80, no 12 le 28 mars 2016 De nouvelles révélations montrent la responsabilité des patrons et du gouvernement dans la catastrophe ferroviaire au Québec JOHN STEELE MONTRÉAL — De nouvelles révélations le 7 mars à la une du Globe and Mail, le quotidien national de langue anglaise du Canada, mettent clairement en cause la responsabilité des patrons de la Montreal, Maine & Atlantic Railway, aujourd'hui disparue, et la complicité du ministère canadien des Transports dans la catastrophe ferroviaire du 6 juillet 2013 à Lac-Mégantic au Québec. « Près de trois ans après la catastrophe ferroviaire à Lac-Mégantic, de nouvelles informations montrent que l'explosion tragique [...] aurait pu être évitée par une simple procédure de sécurité d’une durée de 10 secondes que Transports Canada n'a pas exigée de la société ferroviaire, qui réduisait ses dépenses, » écrit le journaliste du Globe Grant Robertson. Les patrons de la compagnie ferroviaire ont ordonné à leurs conducteurs de train — à l’équipage d'une seule personne sur leurs trains de pétrole en vertu d'une dérogation spéciale approuvée par l’agence gouvernementale — de ne pas utiliser le système de freinage automatique, selon le Globe. Au cours des jours suivants, l’article de Grant Robertson a été suivi d’une série d’articles détaillant comment les patrons de la Montreal, Maine & Atlantic ont sacrifié la sécurité afin d'augmenter leurs profits, alors que le gouvernement fermait les yeux. Les révélations contenues dans ces articles renforcent la lutte du conducteur de locomotive Thomas Harding et du contrôleur de train Richard Labrie, membres de la section locale 1976 du syndicat des Métallos, qui sont victimes d'un coup monté, qui font face à 47 chefs d'accusation de négligence criminelle causant la mort passibles d'emprisonnement à perpétuité, et qui servent de boucs émissaires pour la catastrophe. Des accusations similaires ont aussi été portées contre le directeur d’opérations, un cadre de deuxième rang, Jean Demaître. « C'est difficile de comprendre pourquoi les propriétaires de la MMA ou l'ancien ministre des Transports n'ont pas été accusés, au lieu des trois personnes qui ont été accusées, » a expliqué au Militant André Blais, un militant de la Coalition des citoyens et organismes engagés pour la sécurité ferroviaire à Lac-Mégantic, après avoir vu les articles du Globe. Après avoir stationné le train de pétrole brut de 72 wagons à 11 kilomètres de Lac-Mégantic, Thomas Harding est allé se coucher après 12 heures de travail. Comme il l'avait fait à maintes reprises, il a serré les freins à air du moteur principal et un certain nombre de freins à main sur les wagons-citernes. Les pompiers qui ont répondu à un petit feu dans la locomotive, résultat de l'entretien inadéquat par l'entreprise, ont arrêté le moteur. Cette action, approuvée par un agent de l’entreprise sur place, a provoqué la dépressurisation des freins à air. Le train a roulé sur la pente de 11 kilomètres jusqu’à la ville, où il a déraillé et explosé, tuant 47 personnes et brûlant le secteur historique du centre-ville. Grant Robertson cite des experts de l'industrie ferroviaire qui expliquent que le système de freinage « automatique » installé sur les wagons-citernes aurait maintenu le train en place après que les freins à air de la locomotive de tête ont lâché. La décision des patrons de la Montreal, Maine & Atlantic d’ordonner aux conducteurs de train de ne pas utiliser le système « automatique » de secours, une décision non contestée par les responsables de Transports Canada, visait à économiser du temps et de l’argent. Il faudrait de 15 minutes à une heure de plus pour pressuriser à nouveau le système de freinage et redémarrer le train le lendemain. Selon Grant Robertson, la MMA « avait la réputation d'être l'une des entreprises les plus agressives de l'industrie ferroviaire en matière de réduction de coûts et avait reçu des dérogations inhabituelles de Transports Canada, telles que le droit de fonctionner avec un équipage d'un seul homme, ce qui lui avait permis d'économiser de l'argent en frais de personnel. » Transports Canada a maintenant mis en place une nouvelle réglementation demandant l'utilisation du système de freinage automatique de secours. Les 179 pages du rapport officiel du Bureau de la sécurité des transports sur la catastrophe du Lac-Mégantic ne contiennent qu’un paragraphe à la page 105 disant qu’elle aurait « probablement » été évitée si le système de sauvegarde avait été utilisé, selon le Globe. Mais le rapport du Bureau de la sécurité est consacré à rejeter la responsabilité sur Thomas Harding pour ne pas avoir serré davantage de freins à main. « Je ne serais pas étonné de voir plus de surprises, » à mesure que toute cette affaire se déroule, a dit Thomas Walsh, l'avocat de Thomas Harding, au Militant. « Dès le début, le but des accusations a été de nous éloigner des vrais problèmes et des personnes qui les ont provoqués. Nous devrions nous concentrer sur les individus qui ont pris les décisions pour Transports Canada et la MMA, comme la décision d'opérer les trains avec un équipage d'un seul homme. » Aucune date n'a encore été fixée pour le procès de Thomas Harding et Richard Labrie. Thomas Walsh a dit qu'il présentera une motion demandant au juge une « suspension des procédures, » essentiellement pour rejeter les accusations, lors d'une audience fixée au 4 avril. « Il n'y a pas ici matière à procès criminel, a dit Thomas Walsh. Tout ce que le procureur de la couronne prépare est un « procès-spectacle ». Pendant ce temps, les patrons des chemins de fer « expérimentent un nouvel endroit pour stocker l'excès de pétrole brut : des wagons vides, » a rapporté le Wall Street Journal le 28 février. En raison de la forte baisse des prix du pétrole au cours de la dernière année, les compagnies pétrolières cherchent à stocker le pétrole plutôt qu’à l'expédier. Et les chemins de fer ont environ 20 000 wagons-citernes vides, environ un tiers de la flotte nord-américaine. Ainsi, les patrons garent les citernes remplies de pétrole volatile sur des voies de garage à proximité des voies en service et des zones habitées. « Les problèmes vont des voitures-citernes qui fuient jusqu'au risque de collisions et d'incendies, » a affirmé le Journal. Les messages de solidarité pour la défense de Tom Harding et de Richard Labrie doivent être envoyés à leur syndicat, Métallos/Section locale 1976, 2360 De Lasalle, bureau 202, Montréal, QC H1V 2L1. Courriel : info@1976usw.ca. Des copies doivent être envoyées à : Thomas Walsh, 165 Rue Wellington N. Suite 310, Sherbrooke, QC Canada J1H 5B9. Courriel : thomaspwalsh@hotmail.com Les contributions financières peuvent être envoyées au Canada au Syndicat des Métallos, 565, boulevard Crémazie Est, bureau 5100, Montréal, QC H2M 2V8. Aux États-Unis, faites parvenir vos chèques au Tom Harding Defense Fund, First Niagara Bank, 25 McClellan Drive, Nassau, NY 12123. _________________ Abonnement d’essai : 12 semaines pour 7 $ CAN Pour vous abonner, envoyez un chèque au nom du Militant ou contactez-nous : 7107, rue St-Denis, suite 204, Montréal, H2S 2S5 ? 514-272-5840 cllc_can@bellnet.ca ou consultez la liste de distributeurs dans le Militant (www.themilitant.com)
John Steele
8 Mars 2016 à 09:38

Cher Amis: Les deux article du Globe and Mail ci-joint sont très importantes pour vote journal. Merci John Steele
John Steele
8 Mars 2016 à 09:36

Chers Amis: Pour votre information j'avais envoyé deux articles qui étaient sur le premier page du Globe and Mail hier et aujourd'hui. Ils sont res importantes pour votre journal. Merci John Steele Montreal March 7, 2016 Ottawa's plans to address rail safety under scrutiny By GRANT ROBERTSON Liberal government's budget plans examined following a Globe and Mail report that a 10-second procedure could have prevent the Lac-Mégantic rail tragedy The government's plans to address rail safety in the upcoming federal budget are coming under heightened scrutiny amid new revelations about the Lac-Mégantic rail disaster, which killed 47 people in 2013, but could have been prevented by a simple 10-second safety procedure. The Liberal government said after last fall's federal election that it plans to bolster rail safety in response to the Lac-Mégantic tragedy, in which a train loaded with highly volatile crude oil was left unattended and rolled down a hill into the Quebec town, where it exploded, killing dozens of people instantly. What prominence rail safety will get in the March 22 budget is uncertain. An internal communiqué sent to Transport Canada staff on Friday and obtained by The Globe and Mail indicates the department is bracing for cuts. The memo, titled Budget Planning for Next Fiscal Year, informs staff that "the budget situation is going to continue to be difficult for the year ahead," and recommends employees find ways to "work differently and better together." Within Transport Canada, a new board has been established "to review all staffing actions, and ensure they remain within the department's salary envelope," according to the memo, signed by deputy Minister of Transport Jean-François Tremblay. Staffing levels at the department were called into question after the Lac-Mégantic explosion, when a report by the Auditor-General of Canada raised alarms about Transport Canada's ability to enforce its own safety rules. Among the key concerns was a shortage of safety inspectors and auditors to catch rule violations by railways, and to ensure those companies were adhering to safety standards. The Globe and Mail reported on Monday1 that new information provided by an expert source inside the rail industry reveals the Lac-Mégantic disaster could have been prevented had the train operator used a 10-second safety procedure the night of the crash. Turning a lever inside the cab and activating the automatic air brakes on the train's more than 70 rail cars, coupled with the minimal number of handbrakes set that night, would have been enough to hold the train in place for at least a day, if not considerably longer. The train began to roll down a hill after the locomotive was shut off that night by fire crews extinguishing a blaze. Turning the engine off caused the air brakes on the locomotive to lose air, rendering them ineffective. The engineer set seven handbrakes, devices that are set by hand on a rail car, but they were not enough to hold the train. The automatic air brakes on the rail cars, which were not activated, are separate from the other brakes, taking much longer to lose air, and would have been a sufficient back-up to the hand brakes. The expert, who requested anonymity because he is employed in the sector, said the Lac-Mégantic train, with more than 70 rail cars, would have stayed in place until morning – and probably much longer – before some of the automatic brakes would release. In conjunction with the small number of handbrakes set, the two safety steps together would have held the train. The Transportation Safety Board's investigation into the disaster supports this idea, concluding that the use of the automatic brakes "would have acted as a temporary secondary defence, one that likely would have kept the train secured, even after the eventual release of the independent [locomotive] brakes." The report also points out that other railways, such as Canadian National, often use the automatic brakes as a back-up safety measure. However, Montreal Maine and Atlantic (MMA), the railway involved in the disaster, told its staff not to use the automatic brakes. Even though they take as little as 10 seconds to activate, it can take up to an hour to get the train moving again as the system recharges, depending on its length, the air temperature and other factors. Transport Canada is supposed to vet railways' operating procedures, meaning that MMA's instruction not to use the automatic brake as a back-up was listed in its operating manuals, yet raised no alarms. Auditors of MMA's manuals either did not notice notice it or saw no problem. At the release of its 2014 report into the disaster, then-TSB chair Wendy Tadros called MMA "a company with a weak safety culture ... where unsafe conditions and unsafe practices were allowed to continue. Which begs a question: Who, then, was in a position to check on this company ... to make sure safety standards were being met? Who was the guardian of public safety? That's the role of government; to provide checks and balances." The TSB's admission that the automatic brake "likely" would have prevented the accident if it was used as a secondary defence is on page 105 of the 179-page report and limited to a single paragraph. "This is another example of self-regulation gone amok," said Bruce Campbell, executive director of the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, which has studied the regulatory problems that contributed to the Lac-Mégantic accident. The practice of letting railways write their own operating procedures under the Rail Safety Act that are then vetted by government auditors "has become a substitute for oversight," Mr. Campbell said. Transport Canada said on Monday the department employed about 100 inspectors and auditors at the time of the accident. Since then, that number has climbed to 137. "It is important to note that inspections and audits are only one element in the oversight system," Transport Canada spokeswoman Mélany Gauvin said. "The work of Transport Canada's inspectors is complimented by other experts, including researchers, engineers and other departmental officials who play a crucial role." The head of the union representing Transport Canada inspectors and auditors said 137 sounds higher than the reality, and was not sure how the department arrived at that number. However, Christine Collins, national president of the Union of Canadian Transportation Employees, acknowledged the number has risen in the past few years. Ms. Collins said MMA should not have been allowed to write its own safety procedures, particularly when carrying potentially explosive oil. "They should have never been allowed to do what they were allowed to do. They took shortcuts," Ms. Collins said. References 1. www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/new-info-shows-backup-brake-may-have-averted-lac-megantic-disaster/article29044518 March 7, 2016 New info shows backup brake may have averted Lac-Mégantic disaster By GRANT ROBERTSON A simple 10-second safety procedure that would have secured the train was not required by Transport Canada Nearly three years after the Lac-Mégantic rail disaster, new information shows the tragic explosion that killed 47 people could have been avoided by a simple 10-second safety procedure that Transport Canada did not require the cost-cutting railway to use. The revelation comes after the federal regulator issued revamped rail operating rules late last year, aimed at preventing another tragedy like the one that gutted the Quebec town in July, 2013, when a parked train loaded with highly volatile crude oil rolled down a hill and exploded, killing dozens of people instantly and decimating the downtown. In the new operating rules, Transport Canada requires that all trains left unattended – as the Lac-Mégantic train was on the night of the explosion – must be secured by a minimum number of hand brakes, which are brakes the crew sets manually on each rail car to hold it in place. The new rules also call for a backup method to be used for securing the train, and suggests the train's air brakes are one of the secondary defences that should be used. Contained in that suggestion is a nuance that has gone largely unnoticed until now, and has been glossed over in the official report into the Lac-Mégantic disaster. In addition to hand brakes, trains are equipped with two air-brake systems: the independent brake, which secures the locomotives, and the automatic brake, which holds the rail cars in place. The Transportation Safety Board's investigation into the derailment states that the failure of the locomotive air brake (the independent brake) on the night of the disaster was a key factor that led to the tragedy. However, on page 105 of the 179-page report, a single paragraph suggests the accident "likely" would have been avoided had the air brakes on the rail cars (the automatic brake) been set as a backup safety precaution before the train was left unattended. However, Montreal Maine and Atlantic Railway (MMA) instructed its staff not to use the automatic brakes. Transport Canada either didn't notice this practice or saw no problem with it. "While MMA instructions did not allow the automatic brakes to be set following a proper hand brake effectiveness test, doing so would have acted as a temporary secondary defence, one that likely would have kept the train secured, even after the eventual release of the independent brakes," the TSB said in its report. Setting the automatic brake takes only about 10 seconds, yet it would have been enough of a backup measure to hold the train in place long enough to prevent the disaster – and probably much longer, said one railway industry expert who spoke to The Globe and Mail. The expert, who is familiar with braking systems on trains, spoke on condition of anonymity because the person is employed in the sector. In order to set the brake, the locomotive engineer simply needs to move a lever in the cab from left to right, and in seconds the brake shoes are applied against the wheel of each rail car. However, because air needs to be pumped back into the brake line in order to reset the system and get the automatic brakes on each car to release, it can sometimes take from 15 minutes to an hour to get a train moving again once it's been parked. For this reason, some railways don't like using the automatic air brakes as an added assurance or backup to the hand brakes, because it can cost time and money, the rail industry expert said. The TSB determined that on the night of the explosion, the engineer didn't set enough hand brakes on each car to keep the train from rolling down a hill into Lac-Mégantic, where it derailed. While that fact is not in dispute, it is not clear why MMA was allowed to order its employees not to use the automatic brakes as a backup. Asked why the railway was able to issue such an instruction to its staff, Transport Canada told The Globe that its role is "to monitor railway companies for compliance with rules, regulations and standards through audits and safety inspections." However, the department added, "Transport Canada does not approve or enforce company instructions." Automatic brakes are by no means considered fail-safe, though they can be helpful. Edward Burkhardt, the chairman of MMA at the time of the disaster, said the brakes on rail cars also rely on air pressure within the brake cylinder to hold the train still. Over time, the air pressure in some of the brake cylinders can leak off and the automatic brakes will not work. How long it takes for that to happen, though, depends on a variety of factors, including how many cars the train is carrying. The more cars, the longer it takes for the automatic brake to stop working. "It's temporary. How long is temporary? That's subjective," Mr. Burkhardt said in an interview. "It could have been sufficient to hold the train there all night until the relief crew came on, in which case we would have had no such incident [at Lac-Mégantic]. But it might not have been, too. It might have meant that the accident occurred a few hours later than it did." However, the rail industry expert interviewed by The Globe said a train the length of the one that exploded in Lac-Mégantic, which was carrying upwards of 70 cars, would have been held in place for at least a day, or significantly longer, because most of the rail cars' brakes would not have released in that time, and there were seven hand brakes also holding the train in place. It is far-fetched to think the automatic brake wouldn't have played a direct role in preventing the accident, the person said. "This common sense, 10-second procedure has been used to secure rail cars for the last hundred years," the rail industry source said. The automatic brake is now considered an acceptable backup to hand brakes in the new operating rules issued in October. However, it is not clear why stricter rules requiring such backup measures weren't in place the night of the Lac-Mégantic disaster. The tragedy exposed how lax Canada's rail regulations were, with railways often permitted to write their own procedures that were not sufficiently audited by Transport Canada inspectors. In its report, the TSB cited "inadequate oversight" of railway operations as one of several contributing factors in the crash. However, asked why a simple safety procedure that could have prevented the disaster was buried deep in the report, and limited to a single paragraph, the TSB said it didn't want to distract from the main point that trains should be secured with the correct number of hand brakes. "We tried to steer away from any suggestion that air alone is sufficient to hold a train and instead to focus on more permanent solutions to train securement," said John Cottreau, spokesman for the TSB. "The TSB recognizes that an air brake application would have likely ensured that the train would have remained secured until the next morning, but it was not guaranteed." The TSB pointed to a derailment in 2011 in which a train operated by a regional railway rolled away while being held by an automatic brake. But in that case, the train consisted of older, malfunctioning cars with a unique design that weren't properly tested, making the situation difficult to compare. The TSB also says in its report that Canadian National Railway often uses the automatic brake as a standard backup method of securing its trains. Transport Canada also said hand brakes are the priority, but did not say why MMA was allowed to ignore the automatic brake – even though it was flagged by the TSB as something that likely could have saved the town. "Hand brakes are the first line of defence in preventing equipment from rolling away," Transport Canada spokeswoman Mélany Gauvin said. MMA, which declared bankruptcy after the derailment, had a reputation as one of the most aggressive cost-cutters in the rail industry, and had received unusual exemptions from Transport Canada, such as operating with a one-man crew, which allowed it to save money on labour. The revelation that shows MMA train operators were instructed not to use the backup air brake, even though it could have likely prevented the accident, comes at a time when the town is still suffering as it tries to recover from the disaster. A recent study released by public-health authorities indicates two-thirds of residents still suffer from "moderate to severe" post-traumatic stress from the deadly fires that destroyed the downtown, and some are now traumatized by daily events such as sunsets, slamming doors and the sight of trains. The accident has cost the federal government more than $155-million so far in funds that are being distributed to help the community rebuild.
Gaudreau Monique
5 Décembre 2015 à 15:38

Bonjour! J'aimerais savoir si vous pouvez faire paraître une annonce pour une exposition de photos faites par la société d'histoire de Weedon pour le 17 janvier prochain. Si oui, pour quelle date je vs envoie une courte annonce et s'il y a des frais. Merci!
Monique Gaudreau
5 Décembre 2015 à 15:29

J'attends votre réponse, Merci !
Monique Gaudreau
1 Décembre 2015 à 22:27

Bonjour, je me demande si nous pouvons vous faire parvenir un texte pour annoncer une activité au nom de la société d'histoire de Weedon pour le 17 janvier 2016 et sI oui vers quelle date que je dois vous le faire parvenir et s'il y a des frais, je vous remercie, Monique Gaudreau vice prés.
info@sadasdasd.net
29 Octobre 2015 à 16:19

info@sadasdasd.net
donald
2 Juillet 2015 à 12:25

sdfsdf
m.laura lachance
21 Avril 2015 à 07:37

j,aime savoir ce qui arrive aLac-Megantic achaque jour 21 avril 2015